My article on Juan Cole’s Informed Comment: There has been much debate about whether the recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, especially in the latter, will produce a system resembling that of the Islamic Republic in Iran, which was born of revolution in 1979. However, in focusing on what is indeed an important question, two crucial points have gone unnoticed: The speed with which these two revolutions have occurred tells us something about their Persian counterpart’s endurance as it relates to its own grassroots protest movement, and at the same time the revolutions challenge the Islamic Republic’s narrative on the discourse of revolution in the Middle East.
Remarkably, the Egyptian regime—for all its international and regional support, decades of institution-building and massive security apparatus—collapsed after facing only 18 days of an albeit concerted and relentless protest movement that would not settle for any compromise short of Mubarak’s ousting.
The Egyptian government’s inability to survive the protest movement contrasts with the Iranian government’s continued grip on power. After the June 12, 2009 presidential election, large segments of Iranian society morphed Mousavi’s election campaign into a popular protest movement that grew rapidly and reached nearly three million people in Tehran alone three days after the announcement of the results. The speed with which the protests mushroomed prompted Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to order a crackdown a week later. Through the use of mass coercion and the deployment of its own supporters, a sizeable number in themselves, the regime systematically regained control of the streets after months of intermitent protests. The efficacy with which the regime enforced its will on the protesters and its ability to call upon hundreds of thousands of its own supporters signify its ability to endure in the face of a protracted and explosive challenge to its authority.
That the relatively isolated Iranian government was able to weather such a prolonged storm, lasting eight months in all, while the powerful Egyptian regime, which enjoyed regional and international support, notably from the US, fell after only 18 days attests to the Iranian government’s endurance. This is an important point deserving consideration when calculating how to promote non-violent democratic change in Iran.
That is to say, marches and demonstrations alone will not be sufficient to enact peaceful regime change in Iran. As Iran’s opposition tries to rekindle its own protest movement by tapping into the momentum of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, the opposition’s strategy should not be limited to street activity, as it was in the past, but expanded into a more comprehensive approach including strikes, encampments in Iran’s own Liberation Square and, most importantly, garnering the support of Iran’s armed forces—all of which were tactics vital to success in Egypt.
Besides underscoring the Islamic Repubic’s ability to endure and highlighting the necessity for a broader strategy for non-violent action in Iran, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions also provide an ideological challenge to the Iranian regime’s discourse on revolution. Specifically, these recent revolutions cast doubt on the regime’s narrative that Islamic Revolution is the only means by which to topple foreign-sponsored and deeply entrenched dictators in the region. Until now, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 has been the only populist-led revolution in the Middle East. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 were not revolutions in the traditional sense, but military coups against hated monarchs that were immediately supported by the masses. As the sole country to orchestrate a popular revolution, the Iranian government has argued that revolution is possible in the Middle East only through the framework of Islamic Revivalism, positing its own history as a testament to this contention. Arguing that it was solely the people’s belief in Islam as an ideology that empowered the revolutionary movement to overcome the Shah’s western-backed regime, such a narrative of the Iranian Revolution marginalizes other forces and factors that contributed to the revolution’s emergence and success.
Although it remains uncertain which direction they will eventually take, simply by virtue of having emerged within a secular and nationalist framework, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions’ current states of triumph provide an alternative to the Iranian government’s theory of revolution. By doing so, they have inadvertently detracted from the allure of Islamic Revolution, which the Iranian government has long championed. In other words, the Islamic Revolution can no longer claim the mantle of being the only path to popular revolution. This challenge to the Iranian government’s discourse on revolution explains why authorities in Iran, however unconvincingly, are attempting to depict the recent revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia as part of a wider Islamic Awakening.
Thus, in addition to the belabored discussions about the improbability of these revolutions charting a path similar to that of Iran’s in 1979, the two points related to the durability of the Iranian regime and the challenge posed to its narrative of revolution warrant attention because of the crucial insight they offer Iran observers. The speed with which the dictatorships in Egypt and Tunisia fell stands in stark contrast to the Iranian government’s survival after the 2009 post-election turmoil – a critical point that needs to be considered when strategizing how to promote non-violent democratic change in Iran. Concurrently, these recent revolutions bring to the fore an alternative that challenges the Iranian government’s narrative on revolution, revealing that a revolution does not necessarily have to be an Islamist one in order to claim victory over a seemingly invincible authoritarian regime.
Iran Opposition Protests: Popular Unrest Or Media Generated Mirage?
http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/?p=20551
Concludes that it is the latter.
Meanwhile, Juan Cole has another rather poorly thought out article by a guest columnist:
Alimagham: What Egypt & Tunisia Tell us About Iran
:http://www.juancole.com/2011/02/alimagham-what-egypt-tunisia-tell-us-about-iran.html
In the comments I took exception to this statement:
“the opposition’s strategy should not be limited to street activity, as it was in the past, but expanded into a more comprehensive approach including strikes, encampments in Iran’s own Liberation Square and, most importantly, garnering the support of Iran’s armed forcesâ€
I thought this suggestion was entirely unlikely to be realized since the amount of support for the Green Movement is so low, especially the latter idea that the Iranian military would revolt against the IRGC and the government.
http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/?p=20551
You seem to suggest that the IRGC is a monolithic bloc, which it is not. Also, to say that support for the Green Movement is low ignores these people:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_hr7G4At84&feature=related
But don’t fixate on one paragraph. The overall point of the article is to contrast Iran w Egypt and Tunisia to highlight that although protests could be rekindled by what’s happening in the rest of the region, it’s going to be a lot more difficult to replicate Egypt’s success in Iran bc the regime enjoys much more support than Mubarak did in Egypt, and bc the IRGC has a vested ideological and economic interest in the longevity of the system.
Wow! I am stunt. Look at the website that RSH has placed a link as a source. Oh my g-d! Seriously man.
It is filled with Racist and Anti-Semitics articles. “Have you read Talmud lately?” is a perfect example. This is the type of people who support the Iranian Regime and want to see them in power and of course, they will try to minimize movements such as Green Movements because of their inner hatred of certain type of people! wink wink.
This is sickening and I enjoy nothing more than seeing all these people gathered in one place.
Keep it up.
iPouya
While your assertion that a new narrative may be taking place in the region could be correct, unfortunately it is narrow view of the events that have transpired, for the following:
1-The “revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia have NOT been completed. In fact, not much has been accomplished. The only thing that has occurred is that Mubarak has gone on vacation to his beach resort, and his army (from whom he originally emerged) has taken over. The security apparatus of Egypt and in Tunisia have not been dismantled. Thousands of political prisoners and those who have been taken in the past few weeks, remain in jail. In fact, Egypt and Tunisia are still in confrontation with their perspective governments, including wide spread strikes.
2-Iran’s 2009 protests were not about regime change. Regime change has been the wish of Western powers, and many Iranians in diaspora. The 2009 movement was essentially a post election dispute.
3-You forget “where is my vote.” And you confuse the anti-regime demonstrations that happened later, with the initial demonstration which were against the outcome of the election. That is a critical distinction, because when you refer to almost 3 million people coming out in Tehran, you are actually talking about the post-election period when people said “where is my vote.” Once the slogan was changed by a minority into “regime change,” the crowds also fizzled!! There were not even 10 thousand on the streets by that point.
4-The 2 to 3 million who came out, and came out only in Tehran, corresponded exactly to the number of people the election results told us Mousavi got in the capital. The official results tell us Mousavi won in Tehran.
5-There is no comparison between 2009 Iran and what is happening in the ME today. The two issues are unrelated. Confusing a massive election dispute with “revolution” is the reason why the regime in Iran remains in place to the disappointment of many.
6-The comparisons between the current events in ME and 2009 Iran are simply a State Department’s way of deflecting attention from the real issue: We, in America, are losing our client states and by making the issue about “will Iran be next,” we are deflecting attention from ourselves who stand to lose everything.
The real question is, if the US uses its client states in the most important region on earth, while we have more than $12 trillion of debt, a President that keeps spending, and an economy that can’t survive without the deficit, will we be next??? It’s coming!!
iPouya
I agree with the comment you made at 6:04pm.
Finally, a good comment. PB, thanx for your insight. I don’t think, however, either one of us know for certain that the protests fizzled bc the chants changed from “where’s my vote” to “marg bar diktator” like you seem to imply. I think that the protests grew fast until Khamenenei gave his sermon declaring a crackdown, which came after the 3 million-man march in Tehran (and there were demonstrations elsewhere on that day as well). After that, the numbers dropped significantly, which was expected. Regardless of what the State Department says, I feel that blatant anti-regime sentiment was palpable after the election results, actually, even before too. When they set up that human chain to rally for Mousavi’s campaign, you can hear that anti-regime slogans then too, which was before the elections. One of the slogans said: “Nasr min Allah, fathon qarib, marg bar in dowlat-i mardom farib.” You can see the footage of such videos on youtube. this is when the IRGC officer (I forget which one) came out before the elections and accused Mousavi or turning his campaign into a velvet revolution. So yeah, I don’t think it’s entirely accurate to assume that the demonstrators were out only bc of what they perceived to be election fraud, especially since campaign before the elections was already displaying anti-regime sentiments provoking such IRGC comments like the one I just mentioned.
iPouya
I agree with you that there was and is anti-regime sentiments. You make a good point that there were such sentiments before the election. Let me add to those comments that while the demonstrations in Azadi stadium were peaceful, there were other demonstrations throughout the city that were anything but peaceful, further evidence that there were anti-regime sentiment from the very beginning. However, my point is that once the aim of the demonstrations shifted as frustrations boiled, it was easier for the authorities and their enforcers to go on the offensive. Also, recall that the regime attempted to paint them from the beginning that this was a foreign inspired regime change movement (as you pointed out to one occasion regarding IRGC commander, Safavi). Once the dominant sentiment of the movement became anti-regime, I believe, it not only became easier for the government to mobilize its supporters but also those families, young and old couples who had made the bulk of the demonstrations began to go home.
I don’t believe for a second that even Basiji’s are capable to push a determined population home. No doubt they did tremendous damage. I give you a personal example. My cousin who is a successful middle class businessman, owns his own house and buisness, also opposes the regime and went to the streets. But once the tone changed, and he smelled a threat, he went home a day or two before Khamenei’s speech. And, more importantly, once he heard Khamenei’s speech he forbade his kids from going out. The mullah’s are not stupid, for better or for worse, once they smelled weakness that’s when they moved in. And they knew the demonstrations would weaken if they were about regime change and a velvet revolution. This is not to say Iranians don’t want change, but that the mood for confrontation for a desperate removal of the regime is just not there. Not yet and not in all segments of the opposition.
“you forget “where is my vote.†And you confuse the anti-regime demonstrations that happened later, with the initial demonstration which were against the outcome of the election. That is a critical distinction, because when you refer to almost 3 million people coming out in Tehran, you are actually talking about the post-election period when people said “where is my vote.â€
You are right that in my comments above I did not appreciate the diversity within the opposition, and that there were voices against the regime from the beginning.
Try this:Get a Green and ask him why their protests didn’t work but the Egypt and Tunisia bore fruit. The answer will be how the governments in those countries were peaceful and soft reactions to the protestors and humane and all that but in Iran it is full of savege thugs that killed its people.
Nicely put. And in a couple of days when Libya falls, ask them how many Iranians died from fighter bombers dropping bombs on them!
http://mashreghnews.ir/Images/News/AtachFile/3-12-1389/FILE634339725752045000.pdf
75% of Iranians support the Islamic Iran
M. Ali
Iranians have stood up to worse. Let us not forget the revolution of ’79, and even worst the war against Iraq where many gave their lives for their country when they had no arms to defend the nation.
When the time is right, when the public’s anger reaches its zenith, it will happen. What is happening in other nations is the boiling point Iranians had reached in 1977-78. Iran will become secular and democratic. Its a long march.
In Egypt, there are over 2000 missing and feared dead. There are over 10000 new enprisonments the military is not releasing. Just because they did not kill people in front of the camera’s, it does not mean that the current military dictatorship was peaceful. Currently, Egypt is in mass demonstrations and strikes in every segment of the economy for reforms that have not happened. They are also asking for the prisoners be released. Egypt is just beginning the hard process of reaching democracy.
PB, I think your cousin’s sentiment is legitimate, and this is where we should find common ground, that perhaps a multitude of reasons prompted the protests to fizzle out. While your cousin could no longer identify w the slogans, I have lots of friends who after Neda was shot and after they saw that horrifying footage, were stopped by their parents from coming out, especially the young women. So I think we’re both wrong to say that it was bc of one reason like the crackdown or the change in slogans, but perhaps a combination, but I definitely believe that the crackdown had a serious impact on the Green Movement’s ability to bring out large droves like before.
Anyway, I think this has been a fruitful discussion and I look forward to more of your posts.
ps, I wasn’t referring to Safavi when I made that reference. I would have remembered his name, but I found the source, it was a charge made by Brigadier General Yadollah Javani:
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5592OM20090610
iPouya
I agree. Thanks