iPouya

Tehran Bureau: What is now known as Iran’s Green Movement was born on June 13, 2009, in reaction to massive electoral fraud during the Islamic Republic’s tenth presidential election. The aftermath of the elections sent shockwaves throughout the regime, especially as many believed the government was desperate to show internal solidarity and legitimacy ahead of potentially historic negotiations with the U.S. administration.Following the election, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the reformist contenders-turned-opposition leaders, gave their blessings to the impromptu civil protests. In the past seven months, they have endorsed and even taken part in a number of the demonstrations. This itself represents a turning point in Iranian politics. Since President Mohammad Khatami ushered in a Reform movement in 1997, the Islamic Republic’s reformist statesmen had never directly sided with student protesters and other civil society forces or participated in their contentious politics.

Notwithstanding the Reformists’ integral role in confronting regime hardliners, it is still unclear who is really providing political guidance to the Green Movement: the symbolic leadership triangle of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami, or the invisible grassroots network of activists, including students, bloggers, neighborhood activists, women, the expatriate community, and political pundits. While the seventeen official statements issued by Mousavi have at times endorsed a return to the original values of the Islamic Revolution and the post-1979 constitution, the radicalization of the slogans on the streets — which increasingly challenge Khamenei, and to a lesser extent the Islamic Republic system — as well as the recent use of violent methods of resistance against security forces during Dec. 27’s Ashura protests, suggest a different reality.

In fact, the grassroots perform a viable, innovative and semiautonomous role in the dynamics of the Green Movement. In the past seven months, the Green Movement has waged a fairly successful nonviolent war of attrition against the ruling power bloc. Its participants have engaged the state’s security forces in numerous street confrontations in a calculated, decentralized approach. The repeated use of violence against nonviolent protesters will, inevitably, demoralize some of these forces and, in fact, has already resulted in internal dissention among the security forces’ rank and file as well as the regime elite. Yet as much as this pragmatic approach may have minimized the impact of the repressive apparatuses (police, Basij militia, vigilante groups, etc.) on the movement, it is hardly a blueprint for a democratic transition.

However, the grassroots efforts do not diminish the contributions of the ipso facto leadership, which provide the movement some degree of coherence, political symbolism, and a foothold in the hardliners’ camp for the clerical establishment to bring pressure on the ruling elite from within. In terms of articulating the demands and slogans of the movement, they administer a “spiritual” and hands-off style of leadership. The current leadership and their religious followers prefer a reformed Islamic Republic, without an interventionist Supreme Leadership and its associated organs. They opt to increase the system’s “republicanism” and render the political process more competitive and rational. More secular-oriented Iranians, however, hope to see a truly secular democracy in Iran, with free elections and a new liberal-democratic constitution.

What is missing is a political leadership that provides a more specific platform for change as well as a clear vision for a democratic Iran. This inadequacy stems from two facts: Mousavi and Karroubi never anticipated to be in the leadership positions of a movement challenging the very system they contributed to in the past three decades; also, while acknowledging the movement’s internal diversity, they do not want to alienate any segment by providing a set of do’s and don’ts associated with a political platform.

However, the absence of a democratic political platform is becoming more of a concern these days, when new rumors of the pending arrests of current leaders are reverberating throughout Tehran. In such an event, who would fill the political void? Now that the original electoral demands are becoming less relevant, what new goals or issues would define the Green Movement? While some of the periodic declarations issued by Mousavi have contained positive guidelines, they have largely remained at the level of generalities: a firm commitment to the causes of the movement; condemnation of the illegitimate administration of Ahmadinejad as well as of the brutalities committed by the authorities; respect for pluralism in the movement; and the need for legal reforms in the Islamic Republic system.

Mousavi’s January 1 declaration took a step in the right direction in delineating demands more clearly. The five-point demands included an indirect call for the impeachment of Ahmadinejad by Majlis and a reference to free elections with preconditions such as freeing of political prisoners and freedom of political parties, assembly, and the press.

Nonetheless, controversial statements have periodically surfaced in Mousavi’s declarations, mainly of concern to the secular-democratic forces. First and foremost, he has framed the Green Movement as essentially Islamist, cloaked in a Shiite political culture that offers a return to the ideals of the 1979 Revolution, while presenting an infallible image of Ayatollah Khomeini. Meanwhile, Mousavi has remained silent about the specific concerns of various civil society forces, such as women’s, workers’ and minority rights groups, perhaps overconfident in the capacity of the present Constitution to address the current problems of discrimination and authoritarianism.

While Mousavi and his supporters try to justify such a minimalist approach by invoking the power of the hardliners and the more religious segments of society, they hardly provide a convincing argument from the vantage point of secular-democratic forces in Iran. The current leadership needs to redefine itself through integrating other democratic forces, particularly, representatives of the traditionally excluded, including women, secularists, Islamic liberals, and other minority groups.

If Mousavi is unwilling or unable to take on this inclusion of forces under the Green banner, these groups may ultimately be pushed to form a grand democratic “rainbow coalition.” Such a coalition would need to address two major concerns: First, how to end all forms of discrimination currently built into the Islamic Republic’s constitution, and second, the promise of open, competitive, and free elections.

Whether the current leadership is willing to address these concerns depends on a number of factors: to what extent splinter forces within the conservative “principalists” are willing to desert Ahmadinejad and side with the Greens, or at least show a willingness for compromise; how the duration of the war of attrition may allow secular-democratic demands to become more vocal; and finally, how new leadership presents its political philosophy in the event of the arrest of present leaders.

Mehrdad Mashayekhi is a visiting assistant professor at Georgetown University.

Christian Science Monitor – Excerpt: “Opposition Green Movement activists in major cities around Iran are playing a cat-and-mouse game with authorities seeking to shut down their operations ahead of Feb. 11, a revolutionary anniversary that the activists are hoping to use for the country’s largest street protests yet. ‘The whole future … is at stake,’ said Shahab Mousavvat, a London-based exile who used to work for the state-run broadcaster Press TV. ‘Incremental actions are planned from the 1st through the 11th of February.’ Feb. 11, 1979, was the culmination of the Islamic Revolution that overthrew Iran’s then-monarch, Shah Reza Pahlavi. Demonstrators communicating via e-mail and cellphone are planning a week of ‘civil resistance.’ Since Monday, organizers have been seeking Green Movement supporters through SMS messages, patriotic video clips posted on the Internet, and slogans daubed on walls. They’re encouraging residents of large cities to shout ‘Allahu Akbar’ from rooftops, and are planning a series of protest marches leading up to Feb. 11, when a major pro-government march is planned. Opposition activists say they intend to infiltrate that pro-government march in large numbers. Once in Tehran’s Azadi Square, where state broadcaster cameras will be rolling, they plan to whip out protest banners and transform the crowd into a sea of green.”

iPouya: In my opinion, if they actually go through with the plan of hijacking the pro-regime demonstrations, the pro and anti-regime protesters will end up turning the event into a street fight.  In other words, this specific plan is a horrible strategy.  Turning official days of protest as days to vent against the regime makes complete sense, but to try to take over pro-regime rallies is foolish and naive. I really hope they are not considering this option seriously.

The Guardian – Excerpt: “Iranian MPs lifted a blanket of official denial on the country’s post-election upheaval today by blaming a ­senior regime insider for abuses that led to the deaths of at least three prisoners in a detention centre. In the first publicly documented ­admission that abuses occurred in the weeks after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election, the majlis, Iran’s parliament, identified Saeed Mortazavi, Tehran’s former chief ­prosecutor, as the main culprit in the scandal over the Kahrizak facility. A report read out to MPs said 147 prisoners had been held in a 70-square-metre room for four days without proper ventilation, heating and food on ­Mortazavi’s orders. The prisoners were sent to ­Kahrizak after being arrested at a demonstration on 9 July, less than a month after ­Ahmadinejad’s victory.” Read on here.

NY Times Op-Ed: “THE Islamic Republic of Iran is not about to implode. Nevertheless, the misguided idea that it may do so is becoming enshrined as conventional wisdom in Washington. For President Obama, this misconception provides a bit of cover; it helps obscure his failure to follow up on his campaign promises about engaging Iran with any serious, strategically grounded proposals. Meanwhile, those who have never supported diplomatic engagement with Iran are now pushing the idea that the Tehran government might collapse to support their arguments for military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets and adopting “regime change” as the ultimate goal of America’s Iran policy.” Read on here.

The Economist: “Signs of the regime’s fading legitimacy are numerous. In December, for instance, the head of Iran’s central bank issued a stern warning that from January 8th it would no longer accept bank notes defaced by extra words. In practice, this would mean taking millions of notes out of circulation, following a quiet campaign by oppositionists to mark them with anti-regime slogans. More embarrassing still for a regime that describes itself as Islamic is the government’s treatment of dissident clerics, including some prominent ayatollahs. The most senior was Grand Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri, a confidant of the Islamic Republic’s founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with whom he fell out of favour shortly before the old man’s death in 1989. Placed under house arrest for a decade, Mr Montazeri continued to criticise the government, siding openly with the reformists after the tainted June elections.”

The Christian Science Monitor: Pro-government demonstrators in Iran launched a 10-day religious mourning period on Friday with nationwide rallies and calls for the execution of opposition leader and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi.

Pressure has been building from Iranian judicial authorities in recent days to arrest Moussavi and other top reform figures, who have led protests against presidential election last June they say were fraudulent.

“Mousavi, this is our last warning. The sedition leaders should be executed,” people chanted in Tehran, according to Reuters.

But the opposition is nevertheless optimistic heading into the holy month of Moharram, which peaks with commemoration of the death in 680 AD of one of the most revered Shiite saints, Imam Hossein. The coming 10 days of mourning are heavily infused with religious symbolism, and offer ample opportunities for the opposition to promote their cause – a cause that they say has been steadily drawing a broader base of support.

“Inside Iran, the opposition are much more hopeful than we are outside Iran, because they witness the development and the progress,” says Ebrahim Mehtari, a 27-year-old Iranian opposition activist and software engineer who fled to Turkey after being arrested twice. He has since kept in close touch with opposition figures.

Antigovernment protesters made no attempt to hijack official rallies on Friday, as they have done with other regime-sanctioned events in recent months, resulting in clashes. Opposition websites told their people to keep away from the heavily policed events on Friday, and instead have plans to take advantage of street marches and ritual associated with the mourning period to make their political point.

“Moharram is very good for us, because Hossein’s ideology stood against oppression,” says Mr. Mehtari, who says he was subject to whippings, cigarette burns, and sexual assault with a baton while in prison. Those claims are supported by Mr. Mehtari’s medical report, highlighted in an Amnesty International catalogue of regime abuses released earlier this month.

Green Movement sees itself in heroic martyr role

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Islamic leaders have always cast themselves in the role of the religiously pure Hossein, facing off against the modern-day equivalents of the evil Yazid. Yazid claimed his state was Islamic, but nevertheless killed Hossein, the grandson of the prophet Mohammad.

Known among the devout as the “Lord of the Martyrs,” Hossein’s example of willingness to die for his beliefs defines Shiite belief and is an ideological pillar of the Islamic Republic.

But today, the opposition Green Movement sees itself as the pure side of the Hossein saga, aided by the fact that Mousavi’s second name is Hossein, and the Green Movement’s choice of color is Islamic green, which is waved constantly at such religious events.

“Now from our people’s point of view, [Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali] Khamenei is close to Yazid, and Mousavi and the Green Movement is the Hossein figure,” says Mehtari in an interview in the Turkish capital, Ankara.

“The state can’t tell people not to shout ‘Ya Hossein,’” part of a chant that has become a pro-Mousavi slogan, says Mehtari. “They can’t tell people not to wave green flags…. For 10 nights and two days, people can come out onto the streets. It’s a religious regime; they can’t prevent people.”

Fear of ‘Yazid’ label has made authorities cautious during Moharram

In the past, sensitivities about being branded “Yazid” have meant state authorities exercised a lighter touch on policing on the streets, for couples caught holding hands, for example. Instead of being arrested, they might be simply hurried on their way.

“They have all the tools of repression: the money, the guns,” says Mehtari. “[But] it’s impossible for the regime to stop people. If they slap one person in Tehran, they will be Yazid.”

Still, in Tehran, there has been a growing chorus demanding an arrest of Mousavi, former President Mohammad Khatami, and fellow reform leader and former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi.

“This show of force [on Friday] is intended to show the public that they [the regime] are many in number, hence inducing fear on the other side and discouraging them from coming out when a big even happens,” said one close observer in Tehran.

“TV has dedicated hours and hours of airtime to say: ‘The judiciary is obliged to carry out the will of the people, and arrest the heads of sedition,” he adds.

On Friday, the Tehran crowd heard: “The judiciary should confront people who continue this sedition … with the maximum punishment,” said Mohammad Hossein Rahimian, a representative of Ayatollah Khamenei, according to Fars News agency, as translated by Reuters.

Iran’s judiciary chief, Sadegh Larijani, meanwhile, gave this warning two days earlier: “I say to leaders of the sedition that we have enough evidence against you,” ILNA news agency quoted him saying. “If the regime has shown tolerance until now, don’t suppose that we do not understand.”

Larijani said the opposition leader actions were “contrary to national security” and a “clear crime,” according to a translation by Agence France-Presse. Their statements allowed “Western countries to make out that the government of the Islamic Republic was in disarray.”

Why Iran has held back from arresting top leaders

But the advent of Moharram – which Shiites have marked for centuries with dramatic public passion plays called Taziyeh – complicates the picture for the authorities.

The top tier of opposition leaders have not been arrested yet, it is widely believed, because the scale of the backlash would be unpredictable.

“The moment when the regime holds guns against its own people – that’s the end of dialogue,” says Mehtari.

Even outside Iran, there are dangers for those who criticize the regime. In Turkey, Iranian agents – who, like the Iranian asylum seekers, do not need a visa to enter – have stopped him twice on the street and told him to shut up, because “we know how to deal with you.”

Another asylum seeker, 21-year-old Maryam Sabri, was recently assaulted on the street in central Turkey after dark by two suspected Iranian agents, who slapped her so hard she fell, then kicked and beat her just two days after she repeated in a BBC interview her claims of being raped four times in detention.